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Defining Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake (2003), the first book in the as-yet-
unfinished MaddAddam trilogy, has proven difficult for many critics. The main reason 
for this is the multiple genre affiliation that appears as one of the most prominent 
features of this work. Shuli Barzilai, among others, has devoted much attention to this 
issue; in addition to detecting signs of dialogue between Oryx and Crake and famous 
literary works of the English tradition (among others, Hamlet, Robinson Crusoe, and 
Frankenstein), she has also pointed out how Atwood’s novel draws on elements from 
science fiction, the Bildungsroman, quest romances, survivor stories and revenge 
tragedies1. In spite of her thorough analysis, though, Barzilai has not been able to 
provide an effective definition for Oryx and Crake; in order to find one we need to turn 
to Atwood herself, who describes her book as a work of speculative fiction. 
In a much-quoted passage from her essay “The Handmaid’s Tale and Oryx and 
Crake in Context” Margaret Atwood distinguishes between what she calls speculative 
                                                
1 See Barzilai, S., 2008, “‘Tell My Story’: Remembrance and Revenge in Atwood’s Oryx and Crake 
and Shakespeare’s Hamlet”, Critique, 50:1, pp. 87-110. 
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fiction and “science fiction proper” (2004: 513): while the latter is a label for “books 
with things in them we can’t yet do or begin to do, talking beings we can never meet, 
and places we can’t go”, speculative fiction “employs the means already more or less 
at hand, and takes place on Planet Earth” (ibidem). Similar considerations are made in 
“Writing Oryx and Crake”, where the author elaborates further on the concept of 
speculative fiction and the way in which it applies to her novel: 
 
[Speculative fiction] contains no intergalactic space travel, no teleportation, no 
Martians. […] It invents nothing we haven’t already invented or started to invent. 
[…] 
Every novel begins with a what if and then sets forth its axioms. The what if of 
Oryx and Crake is simply, What if we continue on the road we’re already on? How 
slippery is the slope? (Atwood 2005: 285-86) 
 
The “road we’re on” includes genetic manipulation, pollution, exploitation of 
natural resources, and abuse of non-human animals. Atwood, always very vocal about 
her environmental concerns – as an author and as an activist2 –, depicts a scenario in 
Oryx and Crake that plausibly results from current environmental policies. All of this is, 
of course, embedded in fiction; more precisely, in a narrative that alternates between 
two different moments in the future: a post-apocalyptic narrative line is intertwined 
with one that relates events from a nearer future, all of them leading up to an 
environmental catastrophe of huge proportions. 
A young man named Jimmy, who thinks of himself as the sole survivor of the as-
yet-undefined apocalyptic disaster, is the main character and focalizer in both 
narrative lines. The reader only discovers the reasons for the catastrophe through his 
memories and his attempts to make sense of what happened. The (narrative) past 
‘catches up’ with the post-apocalyptic present at the end of the book, finally allowing 
the reader some insight into what caused the massive destruction. One may be 
surprised to discover that there is more to it than hazardous environmental policies; an 
individual and over-ambitious scheme of Crake’s, Jimmy’s best friend and leading 
genetic engineer, was actually the main reason for the near-extinction of the human 
race. 
The second book in the trilogy, The Year of the Flood (2009), sheds more light on 
the hectic succession of events that follow one another in Oryx and Crake. Although 
the second novel is not, as one may expect, a sequel to the first one – the same events 
are simply retold from different points of view –, the new characters who express their 
                                                
2 This is to be seen very clearly in much of the critical work about Margaret Atwood. Four out of 
the five critical anthologies and almost every one of the articles that are listed in the bibliography to this 
essay devote much space to Atwood and the so-called ‘environmental question’. The writer’s official 
website (<http://www.margaretatwood.ca> – last visit in January, 2013) also shows evidence of her 
work as an activist. 
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different outlooks on events allow the reader much more insight into the 
environmental catastrophe and what caused it. 
This essay is structured in a similar fashion. While the first section focuses on the 
more ‘classical’ interpretation of Atwood’s dystopian fiction as a form of cautionary 
tale, the second section offers a different perspective on the apocalyptic narration and 
its meaning. Elements from the new philosophical discourse of posthumanism will be 
employed as a theoretical frame to Atwood’s apocalyptic scenarios; new meanings 
may, hopefully, be uncovered or new perspectives revealed – perspectives that by no 
means attempt to contradict more traditional readings, but that may nonetheless 
provide more insight into the meaning of Margaret Atwood’s dystopian fictions. 
 
 
SLIPPERY SLOPES AND CAUTIONARY TALES 
 
Sigmund Freud defined the uncanny as something that evokes a feeling of familiarity 
and yet, at the same time, comes across as strange, frightening and ultimately 
incomprehensible. Such a definition easily applies to Atwood’s speculative and 
dystopian fiction: there is no doubt about the fictive, imaginative quality of the setting 
in a novel like Oryx and Crake – and yet, readers can recognize in it disquieting 
similarities with their own everyday reality. Katherine Snyder describes this feeling of 
cognitive dissonance as the product of a “potential social realism”: 
 
Dystopian speculative fiction takes what already exists and makes an imaginative 
leap into the future, following current socio-cultural, political or scientific 
developments to their potentially devastating conclusions. […] These cautionary 
tales of the future work by evoking an uncanny sense of the simultaneous 
familiarity and strangeness of these brave new worlds. (Snyder 2011: 470) 
 
It is indeed true that much of what we find in Oryx and Crake is a large-scale, 
extreme version of recent (Western) scientific and economic trends. Corporate power, 
for instance, is a major force in Atwood’s hypothetical feature: corporations control the 
environment and those who inhabit it; they have seemingly replaced – or, at best, 
disempowered – any form of democratic government, and they defend their 
supremacy with the help of private police forces, gruesomely named CorpSeCorps 
(Corporation Security Corps). Corporate power also goes hand in hand with scientific 
experimentation: genetic engineering corporations are the richest ones, and they are 
exempted from having to deal with any unexpected outcome their experiments may 
have. Atwood’s dystopian future is in fact defined, among other factors, by a rigid 
separation between the inside and the outside – the inside being the Compounds, 
safe and enclosed areas that the various corporations have bought for their members 
to live in, and the outside being the increasingly unsafe rest of the world. Outer spaces 
are disparagingly called ‘pleeblands’ by the compounders, who also feel free to pillage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Saggi/Ensayos/Essais/Essays 
N. 9 –  05/2013  41 
and trash them and, when necessary, use them as the setting for their hazardous 
scientific experiments. 
Bioengineering and clonation also play a major role. The novel is populated by 
ambiguous hybrid creatures, all of them developed by prestigious scientists in order to 
fulfill various kinds of human needs. Rakunks, for example, are a cross of raccoons and 
skunks, “an after-hours hobby on the part of one of the OrganInc biolabs hotshots” 
(Atwood 2003: 51).3 Thanks to the raccoons’ clean smell combined with the skunks’ 
placid temperament, rakunks serve well as pets. As one may certainly guess, though, 
hybrids are not only being designed to mitigate human loneliness. Aside from rakunks 
there are wolvogs (tame-looking, but nonetheless ferocious, wolves working as police 
dogs for the CorpSeCorps), liobams (combinations of lions and lambs commissioned 
by a religious group as a symbol of the two creatures lying down together), and, most 
notably, pigoons. 
Pigoons are probably the most famous – and ontologically ambiguous – hybrids 
the readers find in both Oryx and Crake and The Year of the Flood. They are 
“transgenic knockout pig host[s]” used to “grow an assortment of foolproof human-
tissue organs” (ibid.: 22). Since they share DNA with humans, they generate discussion 
and uneasiness more than other bioengineered hybrids. As Jimmy recalls from his 
childhood, “to set the queasy at ease, it was claimed that none of the defunct pigoons 
ended up as bacon and sausages: no one would want to eat an animal whose cells 
might be identical with at least some of their own” (ibid.: 24); Jimmy’s father, though, is 
a leading scientist at OrganInc Farms, where pigoons are developed – and where 
doubts soon start to arise as to the nature and origin of the food that is served to 
employees. Although many compounders display a seemingly nonchalant attitude 
about what they eat (“pigoon pie, pigoon pancakes, pigoon popcorn”, jokes Jimmy’s 
father – ibid.), others are no doubt affected by it – among them, Jimmy, still a child at 
the time pigoons first appear in the world: 
 
He was confused about who should be allowed to eat what. He didn’t want to eat 
a pigoon, because he thought of the pigoons as creatures much like himself. 
Neither he nor they had a lot of say in what was going on. (ibid.). 
 
Jimmy’s concerns are similar to those of his mother. A former scientist like her 
husband, the woman soon starts having moral concerns about the Pigoon Project. 
“You’re interfering with the building blocks of life. It’s immoral. It’s… sacrilegious” 
(ibid.: 57), she says to her husband, and soon afterwards escapes the OrganInc Farms 
compound to live as an eco-terrorist in the pleeblands. 
Jimmy’s mother may well give voice to the feeling that readers experience while 
getting acquainted with Atwood’s dystopian future: the feeling of lines being crossed. 
What kind of lines, though, is difficult to tell; are they religious dogmas on the sacred 
                                                
3 All the quotations from Oryx and Crake are from the 2003 Bloomsbury edition. 
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nature of life? Moral paradigms? Humanitarian concerns about the exploitation of 
other species? Or are they aesthetic objections to bioengineering projects that some 
may well perceive as disgusting? A disquieting feeling also contributes to intellectual 
uncertainty: the rationale behind the work of Atwood’s scientists is very similar to 
arguments in the current, real-life bioethical debate (“It’s just proteins”, “There’s 
nothing sacred about cells and tissue”, “we can give people hope”, are Jimmy’s father 
replies to his wife’s accusations – ibid.: 56-57). This, of course, leads us back to the 
uncanny features of Atwood’s fiction. The author herself has not failed to comment on 
this aspect of her work, as Coral Howells shows us: 
 
Atwood insists that she is writing speculative fiction, and not science fiction, 
based on an accumulation of well-documented research, “so there’s nothing I 
can’t back up”. For years she had been clipping news items from papers and 
popular science magazines and “noting with alarm that trends derided ten years 
ago as paranoid had become possibilities, than actualities”. (Howells 2005: 173-
174)4 
 
Moreover, Jimmy’s first memory adds to the disturbing feeling one experiences 
upon realizing that Atwood’s novels blend together real-life events with fictive 
speculation. The fourth chapter in Oryx and Crake is, in fact, entirely devoted to 
Jimmy’s recollection of an enormous bonfire of animal carcasses – one of the real-life 
bonfires, the reader soon understands, that were lit in 2001 to manage the hysteria 
caused by the widespread Foot-and-Mouth epidemic.5 
In light of this, it is easy to understand why Atwood speaks of ‘slippery slopes’, 
although critics have sometimes disagreed on which slippery slope she may be 
referring to. Some argue that the main target of her social critique is the “spreading 
‘virus’ of Americanism” (Bouson 2011: 17) and the consumerism it brings about: 
everything is reduced to a commodity, including nature, animals, and even human 
identity – or, more precisely, Identities, since those, too, have become goods that can 
be bought in order to enter the most prestigious Compounds. In this view every form 
of human abuse of the environment and of other species is only one among many 
aspects of corporate control (Bouson 2011). Other interpretations put more emphasis 
on, respectively, the ‘environmental question’ as such (Howells 2006), female 
discrimination (gender-related issues are not part of the analysis carried on in this 
essay, but they are extensively dealt with in The Year of the Flood and also, to some 
extent, in Oryx and Crake – see Tolan 2007 and Osborne 2010), or (bio)ethical concerns 
(Farca 2010). 
                                                
4 The quotations are, respectively, from “Profile Margaret Atwood”, an article by Robert Potts 
published on the Guardian Review in 2003 (April, 26th, pp. 20-24), and Atwood’s “Writing Oryx and 
Crake”. 
5 See Tiffin, H., 2007, “Foot in Mouth: Animals, Disease, and the Cannibal Complex”, Mosaic, 40:1, 
pp. 11-26. 
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On the other hand, what critics do agree on is that dystopian fictions – Atwood’s 
as well as those of others – function as a warning. “Perhaps the primary function of a 
dystopia is to send out danger signals to its readers”, states Howells (2006: 161); J. 
Bouson corroborates her theory and describes Oryx and Crake and The Year of the 
Flood as “a form of environmental consciousness-raising” driven by Atwood’s belief in 
“the transformative and ethical potential of imaginative literature” (Bouson 2011: 23). 
According to this theory, apocalyptic discourse expresses cultural anxieties about 
human conduct and its possible outcomes. On the one hand, it helps us “imaginatively 
to rehearse the end” we fear (Synder 2011: 486), and thus to exorcise it; on the other, it 
allows us “to experience […] the horror of seeing our own interior worlds 
nightmarishly returning from without” (ibid.), and to adjust our conduct before its 
consequences become inescapable. 
Although all of this is certainly true, I feel that looking at Atwood’s works from 
different perspectives may disclose new meanings of her apocalyptic narratives. In her 
analysis of The Year of the Flood Hope Jeggins, unlike many others, remarks on 
Margaret Atwood’s ambivalence towards apocalyptic fictions: 
 
Atwood has become one of contemporary literature’s most rigorous 
demythologizers of Apocalypse, while at the same contributing to its tradition of 
prophetic warning. […] The Year of the Flood goes beyond merely warning 
against impending environmental catastrophe but sustains a complex critique of 
apocalyptic rhetoric; […] consequently, we might read The Year of the Flood as a 
meta-narrative, a cautionary tale about our cautionary tales (Jeggins 2010: 11; 
italics in original). 
 
Jeggins draws on what Jacques Derrida sees as the paradoxical nature of 
apocalyptic discourse: the fact that it is, indeed, a discourse6. Humanity has not ended 
yet, and the only possible referents for end-of-the-world narratives are other 
narratives; apocalypse is an entirely discursive phenomenon. Echoes of this theory are 
much more easily found in The Year of the Flood than in Oryx and Crake. Although, as 
we said before, the two books relate the same events, they do so from very different 
points of view – and those found in The Year of the Flood are effective examples of 
how apocalyptic rhetoric works. In the second book of Atwood’s trilogy, the focalizers 
are Toby and Ren, two pleeblander women who belong to the eco-religious group of 
the God’s Gardeners. God’s Gardeners live according to very strict, environmental-
friendly rules, upon which they have built their theology; their leader, Adam One, 
periodically makes up sermons to validate the Gardeners’ dogmas, and he depicts 
end-of-the-world scenarios as the inevitable consequences humanity will incur into if 
these dogmas are not respected. It does not take long for Toby to dismiss the 
                                                
6 See Derrida, J., 1984, “No Apocalypse, Not Now (Full Speed Ahead, Seven Missiles, Seven 
Missives)”, Diacritics, 14:2, pp. 20-31. 
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Gardeners’ theology as “scrambled” (Atwood 2009: 46),7 and her uncertainty as to the 
value of its theoretical foundations is solved when she reaches a high rank in the 
Gardeners’ hierarchy. Getting better acquainted with Adam One allows Toby to find 
out for sure that the majority of the leader’s sermons are textual constructs only made 
up to provide the Gardeners’ doctrine with a logical basis. Dogmas such as that of 
human vegetarianism, for instance, need much reflection to be backed up: 
 
The children wanted to know why – if Adam was created as a vegetarian, as he 
surely was – human teeth should show such mixed characteristics. 
“Shouldn’t have brought it up,” Stuart had muttered. 
“We changed at the Fall,” Nuala had said brightly. “We evolved. Once man started 
to eat meat, well, naturally…” 
That would be putting the cart before the horse, said Adam One; they could not 
achieve their goal of reconciling the findings of Science with their sacramental 
view of Life simply by overriding the rules of the former. He asked them to ponder 
this conundrum, and propose solutions at a later date. 
Then they turned to the problem of the animal-skin clothing provided by God for 
Adam and Eve at the End of Genesis 3. (ibid.: 240-241). 
 
The same goes for the idea of apocalyptic destruction as a punishment for 
human sins: “if there’s a penalty, [people] want a penalizer. They dislike senseless 
catastrophe”, Adam One says (ibid.: 241). 
In passages such as the one quoted above the dissonance between reality and 
the way we picture it in order for it to make sense is obvious. This may not appear so 
blatantly in Oryx and Crake; yet, the theme of textual constructs and the realities they 
are superimposed on plays a significant role in that novel, too. The second part of this 
essay will discuss whether and how apocalypse can be considered as one of those 
constructs. 
 
 
APPLIED RHETORIC AND THE LIVING WORD 
 
As mentioned in the beginning of this essay, the environmental catastrophe described 
in Oryx and Crake and The Year of the Flood is not primarily caused by dangerous 
environmental policies, as one is led to think until the very end of the first book. As I 
have already mentioned, the pandemic is actually caused by a very attractive, and yet 
deadly, invention of Crake’s, top Compound scientist and Jimmy’s best friend. Crake’s 
creation is a pill named BlyssPluss, a seemingly wonderful scientific product that works 
simultaneously as a protection from any sort of venereal disease, a contraceptive 
device and a libido enhancer. Although certainly alluring and apparently beneficial to 
                                                
7 All the quotations from The Year of the Flood are from the 2009 Bloomsbury edition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Saggi/Ensayos/Essais/Essays 
N. 9 –  05/2013  45 
the whole humanity, BlyssPluss is actually part of a broader and secret project of 
Crake’s. A few months after its commercial distribution, BlyssPluss causes a deadly 
pandemic that brings humanity to near-extinction; Crake’s intention is to have human 
beings replaced by the para-human population he has secretly bioengineered. Jimmy, 
albeit unknowingly, has been a part of Crake’s plan; after spending his childhood in 
the OrganInc Compound with Crake, he has in fact moved on to study Applied 
Rhetoric, and then to pursue a career in the advertising industry. At Crake’s request the 
two friends reunite, and Jimmy is offered a job in the advertising campaign for 
BlyssPluss. 
Crake discloses the truth to his friend shortly before the pandemic outbreaks: the 
Crakers have not been bioengineered as a playful experiment; on the contrary, they 
are actually intended to replace humans once BlyssPluss wipes them off the world. 
Crake does not dignify Jimmy’s objections with even the slightest consideration. In his 
opinion, the Crakers are fitter than humans both to live in the world and with one 
another: they have not been programmed to experience conflict-provoking feelings of 
any sort; their immune system is indestructible; they lack the ability to think 
symbolically, and their language only comprehends words whose referents can be 
found in material reality; they are only interested in sexual intercourse when it results 
in reproduction, and, since their own excrement is their only nutritional source, they 
do not need to use up natural resources in order to survive. 
According to their creator’s intentions, the Crakers are a post-human population 
– literally and chronologically, since they are supposed to become the ‘new’ humans 
after the ‘old’ ones have disappeared. We see that Margaret Atwood presents us once 
again with an uncanny product of speculative fiction; her novels dramatize current 
philosophical thinking about the emergence of a post-human condition. 
Here it may be helpful to introduce a short digression about posthumanist 
philosophical discourse and its implications. Posthumanism, broadly speaking, aims at 
re-locating humans from their self-assigned position of centrality in the world. Such a 
thing may be done in relation to various coordinates: evolutionary, ecological, 
technological ones. Posthumanism does, indeed, split in many branches – most 
notably, two. One of them focuses on human co-evolution with machines. This branch 
of posthumanism is frequently called transhumanism and tries to make sense of what 
it means to be human in times when human capabilities are constantly enhanced by 
scientific and technological means: plastic surgery allows us to change our 
appearance; powerful prostheses make our bodies stronger; increasingly sophisticated 
technological archives work for us as a potentially all-comprehensive memory. The 
other branch of posthumanism focuses on opposite issues – that is, biological and 
corporeal ones. The idea of co-evolution does not only apply to humans and 
machines, but also to humans and other species, or, more broadly, nature. This does 
not mean, of course, denying obvious biological differences; it aims at questioning the 
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cultural constructs that contribute to the definition of ‘human’, and exploring the fine 
line that separates humans from animals.8 
It is plain to see that both branches of posthumanism describe the Crakers. 
Pigoons, too, display ambiguous post-human features. Margaret Atwood’s interest in 
the post-human condition is obvious, and statements she has made on various 
occasions show that one of her main concerns as a novelist shares the same 
theoretical basis as posthumanist thought. One example is the Kesterton Lecture, 
delivered by Atwood in 2004. Atwood asks questions such as “What is a human 
being?” or, more specifically “How far can we go in the alteration department and still 
have a human being?” (quoted in Howells 2006: 72). 
Various philosophers have tried to answer these same questions that Margaret 
Atwood deals with as a novelist. Humanism is quick to dismiss them by turning to the 
traditional, Cartesian list of ‘human proprieties’ – all those features and abilities that 
are believed to be exclusively human. Although historically many factors have 
contributed to composing this list, particular emphasis is always placed on two of 
them: language and rationality. Traditionally animals are thought of as ‘biological 
machines’, capable only of instinctive reactions to external stimuli, whereas humans 
can articulate linguistic responses and behave according to rational thinking (see 
Wolfe 2010:  xvii-xix and xxi-xxii). Posthumanism questions these assumptions on 
various levels. First of all, it is argued that traditional binary thinking fails to 
acknowledge what happens in the liminal area that necessarily separates polar 
oppositions: the fine line between reaction and linguistic response is actually blurred 
by many factors, such as unconscious influences, repetition compulsion and bodily 
limits that may or may not allow acts of vocal expression (see Derrida 2002: 378, 400-
401, 406). Secondly, language and rationality are seen as self-referential – and thus 
weak – tools that humans employ to mark their separation from animals. According to 
Wolfe, “rationality is not, as it were, rational enough, because it stops short of applying 
its own protocols and commitments to itself” (Wolfe 2010: xx). Even if it is, indeed, 
exclusively human, rationality fails its own premises when employed as a distinctive 
criterion: 
 
Observations are based on a constitutive distinction (between figure and ground, 
say, or legal and illegal) that is paradoxical because it posits the identity of 
difference (the distinction between legal and illegal is itself made within the legal, 
i.e., within one side of the distinction) (Wolfe 1998: xviii). 
 
                                                
8 This is, of course, an over-simplification of the complex discourse of posthumanism. It should be 
noted, for example, that the cybernetic and the ‘corporeal’ branch are often in theoretical opposition 
with one another. Unfortunately, it is not possible to give a full account of that here. For a synthetic and 
yet exhaustive compendium of posthumanist theories, see Wolfe, C., 2010, What is Posthumanism?, 
Minneapolis and London, University of Minnesota Press. 
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The same stands for language, which defines itself as exclusively human through 
human linguistic means. Both Wolfe (2010: xxi) and Derrida agree that this self-
referential use of language is paradoxical: 
 
The idea according to which man is the only speaking being […] seems to me at 
once undisplaceable and highly problematic. Of course, if one defines language in 
such a way that it is reserved for what we call man, what is there to say? But if one 
re-inscribes language in a network of possibilities that do not merely encompass it 
but mark it irreducibly from the inside, everything changes. […] These possibilities 
or necessities, without which there would be no language, are themselves not 
only human. (Nancy 1991: 116; italics in original) 
 
Derrida also argues that the word ‘animal’ is one blatant example of linguistic 
self-referentiality. Humans in fact use one single signifier to refer to a highly 
heterogeneous plurality of beings – “all the living things that man does not recognize 
as his fellows” (Derrida 2002: 402). 
‘Animal’ as a signifier is depicted by Derrida as a verbal cage used by humans to 
imprison other, non-human beings and deny any form or individuality to them. His 
provocative response to this is based on a pun that French allows him: animot. This 
neologism is a homophone for animaux (French for ‘animals’), and it also contains the 
word mot (French for ‘word’). Thus, with one word, Derrida achieves two goals: on the 
one hand, he recognizes the plurality within the animal realm; on the other, he shows 
how much power the signifier has over the signified – how unfit human language is to 
represent reality. Cary Wolfe, too, acknowledges this representational problem. If 
human language is self-referential and fails to represent non-human realities, how is it 
possible to dispel “the specter of philosophical idealism” (Wolfe 1998: xix) and avoid 
representational dead-ends? Wolfe’s answer is that we cannot, indeed, help thinking 
and speaking in anthropological terms. What we can do, though, is make room for a 
“different logic” (Wolfe 2010: xviii), always ‘infecting’ our thought and our language 
with something that acknowledges and states their partiality. Derrida’s animot, a 
linguistic creation that shows linguistic limits, is a very effective example of Wolfe’s 
proposed solution. 
It may look like we have moved away from Margaret Atwood’s fiction, and even 
further away from post-apocalyptic discourse. It is not so. Both in Oryx and Crake and 
in The Year of the Flood the power of rhetoric is a major motif – just as its limits are. 
Both corporations and religious sects like the God’s Gardeners rely strongly on verbal 
means to achieve their own ends; animal hybrids are given names that, according to 
human convenience, either emphasize or hide their origins (pigoons’ hybridization 
with humans, for instance, is not displayed in their name – their disquieting function is 
hidden behind a playful reference to balloons; liobams’ nature of both lions and 
lambs, on the contrary, is explicitly and suggestively stated in their names). Jimmy 
himself has studied Applied Rhetoric and knows very well how signifier and signified 
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may be much more incompatible with one another than people often believe. After 
the pandemic this thought actually begins to haunt him: although he tries to “hang on 
to words” (Atwood 2003: 68), they begin to feel more and more “slippery”: “there was 
no longer any comfort in the words. There was nothing in them” (ibid.: 261). Language 
is clearly no longer linked to reality: 
 
[Jimmy] feels like weeping. Then he hears a voice – his own! – saying boohoo; he 
sees it, as if it’s a printed word in a comic-strip balloon. Water leaks down his face. 
(ibid.). 
 
Jimmy’s situation exposes the limits of linguistic representation in fictional form, 
just as posthumanism does theoretically. Atwood’s novels, though, do not just focus 
on linguistic limits; they also celebrate the possibilities opened up by a ‘viral’ kind of 
language – they present us with Atwood’s own animot. The fictional scenario is that of 
an artist, Amanda Payne, who specializes in “Bioart installations” (Atwood 2009: 56); 
Amanda appears briefly in Oryx and Crake, and then moves on to play a more 
significant role in The Year of the Flood. In both books, she is depicted while working 
on various installations that make up a series called The Living Word: 
 
The idea was to take a truckload of large dead-animal parts to vacant fields […] 
and arrange them in the shape of words, wait until the vultures had descended 
and were tearing them apart, then photograph the whole scene from a helicopter. 
(Atwood 2003: 244) 
 
There is no need to remark again on the conflict Atwood depicts between word-
signifiers and bodily, real-life referents. Like Derrida’s animot, The Living Word brings 
together the verbal and corporeal constituents of reality, and shows the reader their 
conflicting natures, their lopsided co-evolution and the way in which they ultimately 
consume one another. 
A conflict between theoretical constructs and reality has also informed this 
section of the essay, since the focus, here, has not been the (apparent) end of 
humanity Atwood stages in her novels, but the end of ‘the human’ as it is traditionally 
conceived. The next, concluding section will be devoted to discussing possible 
relationship between those two kinds of endings. 
 
 
CHOREOGRAPHIC ONTOLOGIES AND THE END(S) OF HUMANITY 
 
Frank Kermode’s The Sense of an Ending (1967) is a very famous piece of criticism of 
apocalyptic paradigms in literary fiction. David Seed argues that the reason for its 
popularity is the way Kermode depicts “apocalypse [as] a narrative, one of the fictions 
which we employ to make sense of our present” (Seed 2000: 11). Kermode does 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Saggi/Ensayos/Essais/Essays 
N. 9 –  05/2013  49 
indeed state that “apocalyptic thought belongs to linear […] views of the world” 
(Kermode1967: 5) and that it is a “concordant structure” (ibid.: 7) people need to give 
meaning to their lives and stories. Men, he explains, are born and die “in the middest” 
of time and history, and “to make sense of their span they need fictive concords with 
origins and ends” (ibid.). 
Once again we are presented with a case of discursive practices giving shape and 
meaning to an otherwise unconceivable reality. Posthumanist theoreticians would 
argue that this is part of a broader representational attitude; humans represent both 
the world and themselves through anthropocentric discourse – which, up to now, has 
proven inevitable, but also increasingly unfit to portray an evolving reality.  
Today’s world is described by Donna Haraway in her “Cyborg Manifesto” (1985)9 
– according to Cary Wolfe (2010: xiii), a locus classicus of posthumanism – as a space 
populated by new forms of life: “by the late twentieth century, our time, a mythic time, 
we are all chimeras, theorized and fabricated hybrids” (Haraway 1991: 150). Barriers 
between humans, animals, nature and machines are crumbling; different forms of life 
co-evolve and shape one another. Identities are far from being fixed – on the contrary, 
they develop partial, ever-changing connections defined by Haraway as 
“choreographic ontologies” (Haraway 2003: 8). 
Choreographic ontologies are what we find once we abandon the cultural 
constructs through which rigid boundaries between species are usually 
conceptualized – and they are also what Margaret Atwood presents in fictional form in 
Oryx and Crake and The Year of the Flood. In a passage quoted earlier in this essay, 
Hope Jeggins states that “we might read The Year of the Flood as a meta-narrative, a 
cautionary tale about our cautionary tales”. We may also argue that both the first and 
the second novel in the trilogy are apocalyptic tales about the apocalypse of 
anthropocentric cultural constructs and language. They are not so much tales about 
the end of humanity as tales about what is beyond traditional human boundaries – the 
ends of humanity10. 
But what does this mean in representational terms? If human language is 
gradually being destroyed by previously subjugated realities – if signifiers are being 
consumed and eaten up by their non-corresponding referents like Amanda Payne’s 
Living Words – is Margaret Atwood trying to posit a bleak future for any possibility of 
linguistic representation? 
                                                
9 To be found in Haraway, D., 1991, Simians, Cyborgs and Women – The Reinvention of Nature, 
London, Free Association Books, pp. 149-181. 
10 Jacques Derrida is the first one to use this expression. The Animal That Therefore I Am was in 
fact originally conceived as the third in a series of three speeches he gave during his famous ‘Cerisy 
conferences’. In Derrida’s words: “It is only after the event, reading the titles of these three meetings 
(‘Les Fins de l'homme,’ ‘Le Passage des frontières,’ ‘L'Animal autobiographique’) with a feeling of 
uncanniness, that I perceived a sort of prescriptive arrangement, a preestabilished if not harmonious 
order, a providential machine [...], an obscure foresight, the process of a blind but sure prefiguration in 
the configuration”. (Derrida 2002: 371) 
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Perhaps it is too soon to try to answer such a question, since the trilogy still has 
to be completed. Yet we can find in Atwood’s novels some fictional clues as to her 
willingness to explore new representational territories. One of those is the uneasiness 
Jimmy experiences because of the “absence of official time” (Atwood 2003: 3) – it will 
not be surprising, at this point, to know that in the trilogy human instruments to 
measure time no longer work after the catastrophe, and that survivors can only live 
according to the natural day-night cycle. The incipit to Oryx and Crake shows Jimmy 
staring at his watch: “Out of habit he looks at his watch – stainless-steel case, 
burnished aluminum band, still shiny although it no longer works. […] A blank face is 
what it shows him: zero hour. It causes a jolt of terror to run through him” (ibid.). The 
lack of human paradigms to manage the world does indeed terrify him; yet it does not 
corner him in a dead-end. In the closing lines of the novel Jimmy performs the exact 
same action he is seen doing in the first page: he is looking at his watch. Strange 
creatures are approaching, and Jimmy has to decide very quickly whether he wants to 
remain in his hiding place or face the unknown. “Zero hour” is his last thought as the 
novel comes to an end; “time to go” (ibid.: 374). 
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